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Abstract. We develop a new approach that computes approximate
equilibrium strategies in Jotto, a popular word game. Jotto is an ex-
tremely large two-player game of imperfect information; its game tree has
many orders of magnitude more states than games previously studied,
including no-limit Texas hold ’em. To address the fact that the game is
so large, we propose a novel strategy representation called oracular form,
in which we do not explicitly represent a strategy, but rather appeal to
an oracle that quickly outputs a sample move from the strategy’s distri-
bution. Our overall approach is based on an extension of the fictitious
play algorithm to this oracular setting. We demonstrate the superiority
of our computed strategies over the strategies computed by a benchmark
algorithm, both in terms of head-to-head and worst-case performance.
1 Introduction
Developing strong strategies for agents in large games is an important problem
in artificial intelligence. In particular, much work has been devoted in recent
years to developing algorithms for computing game-theoretic solution concepts,
specifically the Nash equilibrium. In two-player zero-sum games, Nash equilib-
rium strategies have a strong theoretical justification as they also correspond to
minimax strategies; by following an equilibrium strategy, a player can guarantee
at least the value of the game in expectation, regardless of the strategy followed
by his opponent. Currently, the best algorithms for computing a Nash equilib-
rium in two-player zero-sum extensive-form games (with perfect recall) are able
to solve games with 1012 states in their game tree [7].
Unfortunately, many interesting games actually have significantly more than
1012 states. Texas hold ’em poker is a prime example of such a game that has
received significant attention in the AI literature in recent years; the game tree
of two-player limit Texas hold ’em has about 1018 states, while that of two-
player no-limit Texas hold ’em has about 1071 states. The standard approach
of dealing with this is to apply an abstraction algorithm, which constructs a
smaller game that is similar to the original game; then the smaller game is
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solved, and its solution is mapped to a strategy profile in the original game [1].
Many abstraction algorithms work by coarsening the moves of chance, collapsing
several information sets of the original game into single information sets of the
abstracted game (called buckets).
In this paper we study a game with many orders of magnitude more states
than even two-player no-limit Texas hold ’em. Jotto, a popular word game,
contains approximately 10853 states in its game tree. Unfortunately, Jotto does
not seem particularly amenable to abstraction in the same way that poker is;
we discuss reasons for this in Section 2. Furthermore, even if we could apply
an abstraction algorithm to Jotto, we would need to group 10841 game states
into a single bucket on average, which would almost certainly lose a significant
amount of information from the original game. Thus, the abstraction paradigm
that has been successful on poker does not seem promising to games like Jotto;
an entirely new approach is needed.
We provide such an approach. To deal with the fact that we cannot even
represent a strategy for one of the players, we provide a novel strategy repre-
sentation which we call oracular form. Rather than viewing a strategy as an
explicit object that must be represented and stored, we instead represent it im-
plicitly through an oracle; we can think of the oracle as an efficient algorithm.
Each time we want to make a play from the strategy, we query the oracle, which
quickly outputs a sample play from the strategy’s distribution. Thus, instead of
representing the entire strategy in advance, we obtain it on an as-needed basis
via real-time computation.
Our main algorithm for computing an approximate equilibrium in Jotto is
an extension of the fictitious play algorithm [3] to our oracular setting. The al-
gorithm outputs a full strategy for one player, and for the other player outputs
data such that if another algorithm is run on it, a sample of the strategy’s play is
obtained. Thus, we can play this strategy, even though it is never explicitly rep-
resented. We use our algorithm to compute approximate equilibrium strategies
on 2, 3, 4, and 5-letter variants of Jotto. We demonstrate the superiority of our
computed strategies over the strategies computed by a benchmark algorithm,
both in terms of head-to-head and worst-case performance.
2 Jotto
Jotto is a popular two-player word game. While there are many different varia-
tions of the game, we will describe the rules of one common variant. Each player
picks a secret five-letter word, and the object of the game is to correctly guess
the other player’s word first. Players take turns guessing the other player’s se-
cret word and replying with the number of common letters between the guessed
word and the secret word (the positions do not matter). For example, if the secret
word is GIANT and a player guesses PECAN, the other player will give a reply
of 2 (for the A and the N, even though they are in the wrong positions). Players
often cross out letters that are eliminated and record other logical deductions
on a sheet of paper. An official Jotto sheet is shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Official Jotto sheet. Players record guesses and answers, cross off alphabet
letters as they become inconsistent, and record other notes and deductions.
Instead of having both players simultaneously guessing the other player’s
word, we could instead just have one player pick a secret word while the other
player guesses it. Let us refer to these players as the hider and the guesser
respectively. If the guesser correctly guesses the word on his k’th try, then the
hider gets payoff k while the guesser gets payoff −k. This is the variation that
we consider in the remainder of the paper.
There are a few limits on the words that the players can select. All words
must be chosen from a pre-arranged dictionary. No proper nouns are allowed, and
the words must consist of all different letters (some variations do not impose this
restriction). Furthermore, we do not allow players to select a word of which other
permutations (aka anagrams) are also valid words (e.g., STARE and RATES)1.
The official dictionary we will be using has 2833 valid 5-letter words. A na¨ıve
attempt at determining the size of the game tree is the following. First the hider
selects his word, putting the game into one of 2833 states. At each state, the
guesser must choose one of 2833 words; the hider gives him an answer from 0-5,
1 If this restriction were not imposed, then players might need to guess all possible
permutations of a word even once all the letters are known.
and the guesser must now choose one of 2832 words, and so on. The total number
of game states will be approximately 2833 · 2833!.
It turns out that we can represent the game much more concisely if we take
advantage of the fact that many paths of play lead to the guesser knowing the
exact same information. For example, if the player guesses GIANT and gets
reply of 2 followed by guessing PECAN with a reply of 3, he knows the exact
same information as if he had guessed PECAN with a reply of 3 followed by
GIANT with a reply of 2; both sequences should lead to the same game state.
More generally, two sequences of guesses and answers lead to identical knowledge
bases if and only if the set of words consistent with both sequences is identical.
Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between a knowledge base of the
guesser and a subset of the set of words in the dictionary corresponding to the
set of words that are consistent with the guesses so far. Since there are 22833
total subsets of words in the dictionary, the total number of game states where
the guesser would need to make a decision is 22833 ≈ 10853. Since the best
equilibrium-finding algorithms can only solve games with up to 1012 nodes, we
have no hope of solving Jotto by simply applying an existing algorithm.
Furthermore, Jotto does not seem amenable to the same abstraction para-
digm that has been successful on poker. In poker, abstraction works by grouping
several states into the same bucket and forcing all states in the same bucket
to follow the same strategy. In our compact representation of Jotto, the states
correspond to subsets of the dictionary; abstraction would mean that several
subsets are grouped together into single buckets. However, the action taken at
each bucket will be a single word (i.e., the next guess). If many subsets are
grouped together into the same bucket, then there will clearly be some words that
have already been guessed in some states in the bucket, while not in other states.
This will lead to certain actions being ill-defined, as well as possible infinite loops
in the structure of the abstracted game tree. This will be exacerbated by the
fact that many states will need to be grouped into the same bucket; on average,
each bucket will contain 10841 game states.
In short, there are significant challenges that must be overcome to apply any
sort of abstraction to Jotto; this may not even be feasible to do at all. Instead,
we propose an entirely new approach.
3 A natural approach
A natural strategy for the hider would be to select each word uniformly at
random, and one for the guesser would be to always guess the word that will
eliminate the most words that are still consistent with the guesses and answers so
far (in expectation against the uniform hider strategy). We refer to this strategy
for the hider as HiderUniform, and to the strategy for the guesser as GuesserG-
BRUniform (for “Greedy Best Response”). GuesserGBRUniform is essentially
1-ply minimax search; further details and pseudocode are given in Section 7.1.
We suspect that current Jotto programs follow algorithms similar to HiderUni-
form and GuesserGBRUniform, though we are not aware of any publicly available
descriptions of existing algorithms. We will use these algorithms as a benchmark
to measure the performance of our new approach.
While HiderUniform seems like a pretty strong (i.e., low-exploitability) strat-
egy for the hider, it turns out that GuesserGBRUniform is actually highly ex-
ploitable. For example, in the five-letter variant using our rules and dictionary,
GuesserGBRUniform will always select ‘doyen’ as its first guess. Clearly no in-
telligent hider would select doyen as his secret word against such an opponent.
Furthermore, the hider can always guarantee that GuesserGBRUniform will re-
quire 9 guesses by selecting a word such as ‘amped’ (note that 9 is the maximal
number of guesses that GuesserGBRUniform will take to guess any word in the
5-letter variant).
Searching additional levels down the tree will probably not help much with
the worst-case exploitability of the guesser’s strategy. The main problem is that
GuesserGBRUniform plays a deterministic strategy, and a worst-case opponent
could exploit it by always selecting the word that requires the most guesses.
We would like to compute a less exploitable strategy for the guesser, which will
involve some amount of randomization. Our overall goal is to compute strategies
for both players with worst-case exploitabilities as low as possible (i.e., we would
like to compute an approximate Nash equilibrium, viewing Jotto as a game of
imperfect information).
4 Game theory background
In this section, we review relevant definitions and prior results from game theory
and game solving.
4.1 Strategic-form games
The most basic game representation, and the standard representation for simul-
taneous-move games, is the strategic form. A strategic-form game (aka matrix
game) consists of a finite set of players N, a space of pure strategies Si for each
player, and a utility function ui : ×iSi → R for each player. Here ×iSi denotes
the space of strategy profiles — vectors of pure strategies, one for each player.
The set of mixed strategies of player i is the space of probability distributions
over his pure strategy space Si. We will denote this space by Σi. If the sum of
the payoffs of all players equals zero at every strategy profile, then the game is
called zero sum. In this paper, we will be primarily concerned with two-player
zero-sum games. If the players are following strategy profile σ, we let σ−i denote
the strategy taken by the opponent.
4.2 Extensive-form games
An extensive-form game is a general model of multiagent decision-making with
potentially sequential and simultaneous actions and imperfect information. As
with perfect-information games, extensive-form games consist primarily of a
game tree; each non-terminal node has an associated player (possibly chance)
that makes the decision at that node, and each terminal node has associated util-
ities for the players. Additionally, game states are partitioned into information
sets, where the player whose turn it is to move cannot distinguish among the
states in the same information set. Therefore, in any given information set, the
player whose turn it is to move must choose actions with the same distribution
at each state contained in the information set. If no player forgets information
that he previously knew, we say that the game has perfect recall.
4.3 Mixed vs. behavioral strategies
There are multiple ways of representing strategies in extensive-form games. De-
fine a pure strategy to be a vector that specifies one action at each information
set. Clearly there will be an exponentially number of pure strategies in the size
of the game tree; if the tree has Ii information sets for player i and Ai possible
actions at each information set, then player i has AIii possible pure strategies.
Define a mixed strategy to be a probability distribution over the space of pure
strategies. We can represent a mixed strategy as a vector with AIii components.
Alternatively, we could play a strategy that randomizes independently at
each information set; we refer to such a strategy as a behavioral strategy. Since a
behavioral strategy must specify a probability for playing each of Ai actions at
each information set, we can represent it as a vector with only Ai ·Ii components.
Thus, behavioral strategies can be represented exponentially more compactly
than mixed strategies.
Fortunately, it turns out that this gain in representation size does not come
at the loss of expressiveness; any mixed strategy can also be represented as an
equivalent behavioral strategy (and vice versa). Thus, current computational
approaches to extensive-form games operate on behavioral strategies and avoid
the unnecessary exponential blowup associated with using mixed strategies.
4.4 Nash equilibria
Player i’s best response to σ−i is any strategy in arg maxσ′i∈Σi ui(σ
′
i, σ−i). A
Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ such that σi is a best response to σ−i
for all i. An -equilibrium is a strategy profile in which each player achieves a
payoff of within  of his best response.
In two player zero-sum games, we have the following result which is known
as the minimax theorem:
v∗ = max
σ1∈Σ1
min
σ2∈Σ2
u1(σ1, σ2) = min
σ2∈Σ2
max
σ1∈Σ1
u1(σ1, σ2).
We refer to v∗ as the value of the game to player 1. Any equilibrium strategy
for a player guarantees an expected payoff of at least the value of the game to
that player.
All finite games have at least one Nash equilibrium. Currently, the best algo-
rithms for computing a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum extensive-form
games with perfect recall are able to solve games with 1012 states in their game
tree [7].
5 Smoothed fictitious play
In this section we will review the fictitious play (FP) algorithm [3]. Despite its
conceptual simplicity, FP has recently been used to compute equilibria in many
classes of games in the artificial intelligence literature (e.g., [4,5]). The basic FP
algorithm works as follows. At each iteration, each player plays a best response
to the average strategy of his opponent so far (we assume the game has two
players). Formally, in smoothed fictitious play each player i applies the following
update rule at each time step t:
si,t =
(
1− 1
t+ 1
)
si,t−1 +
1
t+ 1
sBRi,t ,
where sBRi,t is a best response of player i to the strategy s−i,t−1 of his opponent
at time t− 1. We allow strategies to be initialized arbitrarily at t = 0.
FP is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum
games; however, very little is known about how many iterations are needed to
obtain convergence. Recent work shows that FP may require exponentially many
iterations in the worst case [2]; however, it may perform far better in practice
on specific games. In addition, the performance of FP is not monotonic; for
example, it is possible that the strategy profile after 200 iterations is actually
significantly closer to equilibrium than the profile after 300 iterations. So simply
running FP for some number of iterations and using the final strategy profile is
not necessarily the best approach.
We instead use the following improved algorithm. For each iteration we com-
pute the amount each player could gain by deviating to a best response; denote it
by i,t. Let t = maxi i,t, and let t∗ = min0≤t≤T t. After running FP for T iter-
ations, rather than output si,T , we will instead output si,t∗ — the -equilibrium
for smallest  out of all all the iterations of FP so far.
6 Oracular strategies
Consider the following scenario. Suppose one is playing an extensive-form game
G with 2100 information sets and two actions per information set, and that he
wishes to play an extremely simple strategy: always choose the first action at
each information set (suppose actions are labeled as Action 1 and Action 2). To
represent this pure strategy, technically we must list out a vector of size 2100
(with each entry being a 1 for this particular strategy). On the other hand, it
is trivial to write an algorithm that takes as input the index of an information
set and outputs the action taken by this strategy (i.e., output 1 on all inputs).
Even though there are a large number of information sets, we only require 100
bits to represent the index of each one; thus, it is possible to play this simple
strategy without ever explicitly representing it.
More generally, let Oi be an efficient deterministic algorithm that takes as
input the index of an information set I and outputs an action from AI , the set
of actions available at I. We refer to Oi as a pure oracular strategy for player i.
It is easy to see that every pure oracular strategy is strategically equivalent to
a pure strategy si of the game; at information set I, si simply plays whatever
action Oi outputs on input I.
We define oracular versions of randomized strategies analogously to the
extensive-form case. Let {Oi} be a collection of pure oracular strategies; then
any probability distribution over elements of {Oi} is a mixed oracular strategy.
If we let Oi be a randomized algorithm that outputs a probability distribution
over actions at each information set, then call Oi a behavioral oracular strategy.
As was the case with pure strategies, each oracular strategy corresponds to a
single extensive-form strategy of the same type.
In the next two sections, we will see how the oracular strategy representation
can be useful in practice when computing approximate equilibrium strategies in
Jotto. In particular, a strategy for the guesser is so large that we cannot represent
it explicitly; however, we can encode it concisely as an oracular strategy which
we efficiently query repeatedly throughout the algorithm.
7 Computing best responses in Jotto
In order to apply smoothed fictitious play to Jotto, we must figure out how to
compute a best response for each player. This is challenging for several reasons.
First, the guesser’s strategy space is so large that we cannot compute a full best
response; we must settle for computing an approximate best response, which we
call the guesser’s greedy best response. In addition, we represent the guesser’s
strategy in oracular form; so the hider can cannot operate on it explicitly, and
can only query it at certain game states. It turns out that we can actually
compute an exact best response for the hider despite this limitation.
7.1 Computing the guesser’s greedy best response
Suppose we are given a strategy for the hider, and wish to compute a counter-
strategy for the guesser. Let h denote the strategy of the hider, where hi denotes
the probability that the hider chooses wi — the i’th word in the dictionary. Let
D denote the number of words in the dictionary, and let S be a bit-vector of
size D, where Si = 1 means that wi is still consistent with the guesses so far. So
S encodes the current knowledge base of the guesser and represents the state of
the game.
A reasonable heuristic to use for the guesser would be the following. For
each word wi in the dictionary, compute the number of words that we will
eliminate in expectation (over h) if we guess wi. Then guess the word that
Algorithm 1 GuesserGBR(h, S)
for i = 1 to D do
ni ← ExpNumElims(wi, h, S)
end for
return wi with maximal value of ni
Algorithm 2 ExpNumElims(wi, h, S)
A← AnswerProbs(wi, h, S)
n← 0
for j = 1 to L do
n← n+ Aj ·NumElims(wi, S, j)
end for
return n
Algorithm 3 NumElims(wi, S, j)
counter ← 0
for k = 1 to D do
if Sk = 1 and
NumCommLetts(wi, wk) 6= j then
counter ← counter + 1
end if
end for
return counter
Algorithm 4 AnswerProbs(w, h, S)
for i = 1 to L do
Ai ← 0
end for
for i = 1 to D do
if Si = 1 then
k ← NumCommLetts(w,wi)
Ak ← Ak + hi
end if
end for
Normalize A so its elements sum to 1.
return A
Algorithm 5 NumCommLetts(wi, wj)
counter ← 0
for m = 1 to L do
c1 ← mth character of wi
for n = 1 to L do
c2 ← nth character of wj
if c1 = c2 then
counter ← counter + 1
end if
end for
end for
return counter
expects to eliminate the most words. We refer to this algorithm as GuesserGBR
(for “Greedy Best Response”); pseudocode is given in Algorithm 1.
GuesserGBR relies on a number of subroutines. ExpNumElims, given in Al-
gorithm 2, gives the expected number of words eliminated if wi is guessed. An-
swerProbs, given in Algorithm 4, gives a vector of the expected probability of
receiving each answer from the hider when w is guessed. NumElims, given in Al-
gorithm 3, gives the number of words that can be eliminated when wi is guessed
and an answer of j is given. Finally, NumCommLetts, given in Algorithm 5,
gives the number of common letters between two words. In the pseudocode, L
denotes the number of letters allowed per word. For efficiency, we precompute
a table of size D2 storing all the numbers of common letters between pairs of
words. The overall running time of GuesserGBR is O(D2L).
It is worth noting that the greedy best response is not an actual best response;
it is akin to searching one level down the game tree and then using the evaluation
function “expected number of words eliminated” to determine the next move.
This is essentially 1-ply minimax search. While we would like to compute an
exact best response by searching the entire game tree, this is not feasible since
the tree has 10853 nodes. As with computer chess programs, we will need to
settle for searching down the tree as far as we can, then applying a reasonable
evaluation function.
7.2 Computing the hider’s best response
In order to compute the hider’s best response (in the context of fictitious play),
we will find it useful to introduce two data structures. Let IterNumGuesses (ING)
and AvgNumGuesses (ANG) be two arrays of size D. The i’th component of ING
will denote the number of guesses needed for the guesser’s greedy best response
to guess wi at the current iteration of the algorithm. The i’th component of
ANG will be the average over all iterations (of fictitious play) of the number of
guesses needed for the guesser’s greedy best response to guess wi. We update
ANG by applying
ANG[i] =
(
1− 1
t+ 1
)
ANG[i] +
1
t+ 1
ING[i].
We update ING at each time step by applying
ING = CompNumGuesses(sh,t),
where sh,t is the hider’s strategy at iteration t of fictitious play, and pseudocode
for CompNumGuesses is given below in Algorithm 6. CompNumGuesses com-
putes the number of guesses needed for the guesser’s greedy best response to
sh,t to correctly guess each word. It accomplishes this by repeatedly querying
GuesserGBR at various game states. The subroutine UpdateState updates the
game state in light of the answer received from GuesserGBR. It is in this way
that the hider’s best response algorithm selectively queries the guesser’s strategy,
which is represented implicitly in oracular form.
Finally, once ING and ANG have been updated as described above, we are
ready to compute the full best response for the hider. Pseudocode for the algo-
rithm HiderBR is given below in Algorithm 8. HiderBR takes ANG as input,
and determines which word(s) required the most guesses on average. If there is a
unique word requiring the maximal number of guesses, then that word is selected
with probability 1. If there are multiple words requiring the maximal number
of guesses, then these are each selected with equal probability. Note that select-
ing any distribution over these words would constitute a best response; we just
choose one such distribution. The asymptotic running time of CompNumGuesses
is O(D4L), while that of HiderBR is O(D).
Note that, unlike GuesserGBR of Section 7.1 which is an approximate best
response using 1-ply minimax search, HiderBR is a full best response. We are
able to compute a full best response for the hider because his strategy space
is much smaller than that of the guesser; the hider has only D possible pure
strategies — 2833 in the case of 5-letter Jotto.
7.3 Parallelizing the best response calculation
The hider’s best response calculation can be sped up dramatically by paral-
lelizing over several cores. In particular, we parallelize the CompNumGuesses
subroutine as follows. For the first processor, we iterate over i = 1 to
⌊
D
P
⌋
,
Algorithm 6 CompNumGuesses(sh)
for i = 1 to D do
S ← vector of size D of all ones.
numguesses← 0
while TRUE do
numguesses← numguesses+ 1
nextguess← GuesserGBR(sh, S)
answer ←
NumCommLetts(wi, nextguess)
if answer = L then
BREAK
end if
S ←
UpdateState(S, nextguess, answer)
end while
xi ← numguesses
end for
return x
Algorithm 7
UpdateState(S, nextguess, answer)
for i = 1 to D do
if Si = 1 and NumCommLetts(nextguess,
wi) 6= answer then
Si ← 0
end if
end for
return S
Algorithm 8 HiderBR(ANG)
x∗ ← maxi ANG[i].
T∗ ← {i : ANG[i] = x∗}
for i = 1 to D do
if ANG[i] = x∗ then
yi =
1
|T∗|
else
yi = 0
end if
end for
return y
where P is the number of processors, and so on for the other processors. Thus
we can perform P independent computations in parallel. The overall running
time of the new algorithm is O
(
D4L
P
)
.
8 Computing an approximate equilibrium in Jotto
We would like to apply smoothed fictitious play to Jotto, using HiderBR for the
hider’s best response and GuesserGBR for the guesser’s best response; however,
this is tricky for several reasons. First, it is not clear how to compute the epsilons
and determine the quality of our strategies. And second, it will be difficult to run
the algorithm without explicitly represent the guesser’s strategy; furthermore,
we cannot output it at the end of the algorithm.
It turns that using the data structures developed in Section 7.2, we can actu-
ally compute the epsilons quite easily. This is accomplished using the procedures
given in Algorithms 9– 12.
We are now ready to present our full algorithm for computing an approximate
equilibrium in Jotto; pseudocode is given in Algorithm 13. Note that we initialize
the hider’s strategy to choose each word uniformly at random. In terms of the
guesser’s strategy, it turns out that all the information needed to obtain it is
already encoded in the hider’s strategy and that we do not actually need to
represent it in the course of algorithm.
To obtain the guesser’s final strategy, note that the strategies of the hider are
output to a file at each iteration. It turns out that we can use this file to efficiently
generate samples from the guesser’s strategy, even though we never explicitly
output this strategy. We present pseudocode in Algorithm 14 for generating a
Algorithm 9 HiderBRPayoff(ANG)
maxnumguesses ← 0
for i = 1 to D do
if ANG[i] > maxnumguesses then
maxnumguesses ← ANG[i]
end if
end for
return maxnumguesses
Algorithm 10
HiderActualPayoff(ANG, sh)
result ← 0
for i = 1 to D do
result← result+ ANG[i] · sh[i]
end for
return result
Algorithm 11
GuesserBRPayoff(ING, sh)
result ← 0
for i = 1 to D do
result← result+ ING[i] · sh[i]
end for
return -1 · result
Algorithm 12
GuesserActualPayoff(ANG, sh)
return -1 · HiderActualPayoff(ANG, sh)
Algorithm 13 SolveJotto(T )
sh,0 ← ( 1D , . . . , 1D )
Output sh,0 to StrategyFile
ING← ComputeNumGuesses(sh,0)
ANG← ING
Compute ’s per Algorithms 9-12, t∗ ← 0
for t = 1 to T do
sBRh,t ← HiderBR(ANG)
sh,t ←
(
1− 1t+1
)
sh,t−1 + 1t+1 s
BR
h,t
Output sh,t to StrategyFile
ING← ComputeNumGuesses(sh,t)
ANG←
(
1− 1t+1
)
ANG+ 1t+1 ING
Compute ’s per Algorithms 9-12
if  < ∗ then
∗ ← , t∗ ← t
end if
end for
return (sh,t∗ , t
∗, StrategyFile)
Algorithm 14 ObtainGuesserStrat-
egy(StrategyFile, t∗, S)
i← randint(1, t∗)
sh ← strategy vector on i’th line of Strategy-
File
return GuesserGBR(sh, S)
sample of the guesser’s strategy at state S from the file output in Algorithm 13.
This algorithm works by randomly selecting an integer t from 1 to t∗, then
playing the guesser’s greedy best response to sh,t — the hider’s strategy at
iteration t. We can view this algorithm as representing the guesser’s strategy as
a mixed oracular strategy; in particular, it is the uniform distribution over his
greedy best responses in the first t∗ iterations of Algorithm 13. This is noteworthy
since it is a rare case of the mixed strategy representation having a computational
advantage over the behavioral strategy representation.
9 Results
We ran our algorithm SolveJotto on four different Jotto instances, allowing words
to be 2, 3, 4, or 5 letters long. To speed up the computation, we used the par-
allel version of the bottleneck subroutine CompNumGuesses (described in Sec-
tion 7.3) with 16 processors. As our dictionary, we use the Official Tournament
and Club Word List [6], the official word list for tournament Scrabble in several
countries. As discussed in Section 2, we omit words with duplicate letters and
words for which there exists an anagram that is also a word. The dictionary
sizes are given in Table 1. We note that our algorithms extend naturally to any
number of words and dictionary sizes (and to other variants of Jotto as well).
One metric for evaluating our algorithm is to play the strategies it computes
against a benchmark algorithm. The benchmark algorithm we chose selects his
word uniformly at random as the hider, and plays the greedy best response to
the uniform strategy as the guesser. This is the same strategy that we use to
initialize our algorithm.
For each number of letters, we computed the payoff of our algorithm Solve-
Jotto against the benchmark (recall that the payoff to the hider is the expected
number of guesses needed for the guesser to correctly guess the hider’s word).
The overall payoff is the average of the hider and guesser payoff.
Number of letters 2 3 4 5
Dictionary size 51 421 1373 2833
Our hider payoff vs. benchmark 7.652 7.912 7.507 7.221
Our guesser payoff vs. benchmark -6.619 -7.635 -7.415 -7.216
Our overall payoff vs. benchmark 0.517 0.139 0.046 0.003
Benchmark self-play hider payoff 6.627 7.601 7.365 7.079
Our algorithm self-play hider payoff 7.438 7.658 7.390 7.162
Benchmark epsilon 5.373 3.399 1.635 1.921
Our final epsilon 0.038 0.334 0.336 0.335
Number of iterations 22212 10694 3568 3906
Avg time per iteration (minutes) 3.635× 10−4 0.028 1.160 12.576
Table 1. Summary of our experimental results.
Several observations from Table 1 are noteworthy. First, our algorithm beats
the benchmark for all dictionary sizes. In the two-letter game, our expected
payoff against the benchmark is 0.517; our strategy requires over a full guess less
than the benchmark in expectation. Our profit against the benchmark decreases
as more letters are used.
In addition to head-to-head performance against the benchmark, we also
compared the algorithms in terms of worst-case performance. Recall that  de-
notes the maximum payoff improvement one player could gain by deviating to
a best response (full best response for the hider and greedy best response for
the guesser). Note that in all cases, our  is significantly lower than that of the
benchmark. For example, in the two-letter game the benchmark obtains an  of
5.373, while our algorithm obtains one of 0.038.
Interestingly, we also observe that the self-play payoff of our algorithm, which
is an estimate of the value of the game, does not increase monotonically with
the number of letters. That is, increasing the number of letters in the game does
not necessarily make it more difficult for the guesser to guess the hider’s word.
10 Conclusion
We presented a new approach for computing approximate-equilibrium strate-
gies in Jotto. Our algorithm produces strategies that significantly outperform a
benchmark algorithm with respect to both head-to-head performance and worst-
case exploitability. The algorithm extends fictitious play to a novel strategy
representation called oracular form. We expect our algorithm and the oracular
form representation to apply naturally to many other interesting games as well;
in particular, games where the strategy space is very large for one player, but
relatively small for the other player.
References
1. Billings, D., Burch, N., Davidson, A., Holte, R., Schaeffer, J., Schauenberg, T.,
Szafron, D.: Approximating game-theoretic optimal strategies for full-scale poker.
In: Proceedings of the 18th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(IJCAI) (2003)
2. Brandt, F., Fischer, F., Harrenstein, P.: On the rate of convergence of fictitious play.
In: International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (2010)
3. Brown, G.W.: Iterative solutions of games by fictitious play. In: Koopmans, T.C.
(ed.) Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation, pp. 374–376. John Wiley &
Sons (1951)
4. Ganzfried, S., Sandholm, T.: Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for
3-player no-limit Texas Hold’em tournaments. In: Proceedings of the International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS) (2008)
5. Rabinovich, Z., Gerding, E., Polukarov, M., Jennings, N.R.: Generalised fictitious
play for a continuum of anonymous players. In: Proceedings of the 21st International
Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) (2009)
6. Official tournament and club word list, http://www.isc.ro/en/commands/lists.html
7. Zinkevich, M., Bowling, M., Johanson, M., Piccione, C.: Regret minimization in
games with incomplete information. In: Proceedings of the Annual Conference on
Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS) (2007)
